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A CONFLICT OF DIAMONDS:
THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AND ZIMBABWE'S MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS
Julie Elizabeth Nichols*
ABSTRACT
In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme ("KPCS")
entered into force as a novel approach to regulate the diamond industry
and combat associated atrocities regarding "conflict diamonds." Fueled
by the recent history of bloody civil wars, and graphically publicized
slaughters and amputations by rebel groups funded by African
diamonds, diamond-producing nations, the diamond industry's leaders
and human rights groups created a process whereby "conflict diamonds"
are identified and systematically excluded from the legitimate trade.
However, the KPCS definition of "conflict diamond" has proved
unacceptably restrictive. Diamonds from Zimbabwe's Marange fields
are mined using systematic relocation, mass murdering campaigns and,
recently discovered, torture camps. Yet, because Zimbabwe's
"legitimate" government, not a rebel group, controls the Marange
mines, the KPCS has certified these diamonds as conflict-free, fit for
international trade. To stop this unacceptable situation, in which
perpetrators of systematic and violent human rights abuses benefit
from their crimes, the KPCS's definition of "conflict diamonds" must
change. The diamond industry must support such a change by refusing
to allow trade of any diamond mined through such systematic abuse. If
these changes are not adopted, the United States must use all
additional means, including legislative boycotts and civil suits, to stop
the atrocities occurring today in Zimbabwe's Marange diamond fields.
Over the past few years, the world became quite familiar with the
term "blood diamonds." Recent commercials proclaim diamond retailers
who exclude the middleman offer better quality, less expensive stones
that come with guarantees about their safe, blood-free origin.' When
* J.D. graduate 2012, University of Denver Strum College of Law; M.S.W., Columbia
University. I would like to thank my parents, Jill and Robert Nichols, for their never-
ending support. Additional thanks to Professors Ved Nanda, Eli Wald, Rebecca Aviel,
Rashmi Goel, David Akerson, Beto Judrez and Ann Scales for their time and invaluable
advice. Finally, I would like to thank the entire board and staff of the Denver Journal of
648
A CONFLICT OF DIAMONDS
Valentine's Day comes around, sparkling stones with "Conflict-Free"
certificates receive attention from the more conscientious consumers.
Hollywood informed audiences about the atrocities of Sierra Leone's
diamond-fueled civil war through Leonardo DiCaprio's 2006 movie
Blood Diamond. 2 The movie ends with a conference of concerned
parties seeking an end to the problem of blood diamonds. The film's
conference is a reference to an actual meeting, which eventually led to
the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme - and the
"Conflict-Free" certificates that received so much positive attention.3
The world knows now about blood diamonds and how countries have
eliminated them from their stores - or so it appears on the surface.
Blood Diamond's final scenes depict the first meeting of what
became the Kimberley Process ("KP"), the watchdog organization
designed to prevent the sale of "conflict diamonds." The KP is a tri-
branch organization, consisting of participating states ("Participants"),
which make all official decisions, and representatives of both the
diamond industry and of civil society -NGOs and activist groups - who
serve as official observers.4 The KP regulates aspects of the diamond
industry through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
("KPCS"),5 which is intended to eliminate conflict diamonds from the
market while preserving the legitimate diamond trade.6 The KPCS
identifies and certifies rough diamonds that can legitimately enter the
market.7 It prohibits Participants from importing or exporting "conflict
diamonds," which it very specifically defines, 8 and from trading any
rough diamonds with non-participating states. 9 As more states join,
fewer markets exist for conflict diamonds and, in theory, such stones
International Law and Policy for their encouragement and assistance throughout the
process of preparing this paper.
1. See, e.g., Diamond FAQs, THE SHANE COMPANY, http://www.shaneco.com/Jewelry/
DiamondFAQ.htmx.
2. BLOOD DIAMOND (Warner Bros. 2006).
3. KIMBERLY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/webfkimberley-
process/kp-basics [hereinafter KP websitel.
4. See id.; Liz Ford, Global Witness Quits Kimberley Process in Protest at "Diamond
Laundering," GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/
201 1/decl05/kimberley-process-global-witness-withdraws [hereinafter Ford].
5. See Kimberly Process Certification Scheme, Nov. 2002 [hereinafter KPCS],
available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/ (follow "Documents" hyperlink; then follow
"Core Documents" hyperlink; then follow "KPCS Core Document" hyperlink).
6. Jolyon Ford, The Kimberley Process and Diamond Demand, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS
(Dec. 5, 2011), http://africanarguments.org/2011/12/05/the-kimberley-process-and-dia
mond-demand-%E2%80%93-by-jolyon-ford-at-oxford-analytical.
7. KP Website, supra note 3.
8. KPCS, supra note 5, § I.
9. Id. § 111(c).
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will eventually no longer be sold at all.10 In many ways, it has been
very successful; conflict diamonds now make up less than one percent of
all diamonds on the legitimate market."x
Yet that very specific definition of conflict diamond has caused a
serious dilemma. According to the KPCS, "conflict diamonds" are
"rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments." 12 In
Zimbabwe, there are no rebel movements campaigning to overthrow the
government, therefore there can be no conflict diamonds in that
country. However, diamond miners suffer gross human rights
violations on a daily basis.
On August 8, 2011, the BBC program "Panorama" aired a
documentary disclosing torture camps run by Zimbabwean police and
military.' 3 Witnesses described one camp, known as "Diamond Base,"
where police send miners who want a larger profit share or villagers
caught mining for their families.14 Men receive severe beatings three
times a day and women are raped repeatedly.15 Former paramilitary
police officers describe handlers directing their dogs to maul prisoners
and local doctors report frequently treating such wounds.' 6 Apparently,
these camps have been operating at least since late 2008.17 Though this
BBC documentary may have shocked the public, non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") that have been monitoring Zimbabwe's diamond
mines for years were not even surprised.18 They have been reporting
similar human rights abuses since 2006.19
10. Daniel Feldman, Conflict Diamonds, International Trade Regulation, and the
Nature of Law, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 835, 867 (2003).
11. See KP Website, supra note 3.
12. KPCS, supra note 5, § I (emphasis added).
13. See Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14445087; Victims Speaking of Massacre in
Zimbabwe Diamond Fields, BBC NEWS (Aug. 8 2011), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
panorama/hi/frontpage/newsid_9557000/9557246.stm.
14. Hilary Andersson, Marange Diamond Field: Zimbabwe Torture Camp Discovered,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14377215 [hereinafter
Andersson].
15. Id.
16. Alan Cowell, Britain Urges Zimbabwe to Examine Diamond 'Torture Camp'
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/09/worldlafrical
09zimbabwe.html.
17. Andersson, supra note 14.
18. Chiadzwa Torture Camps Exposed, ZIMBABWEAN (Aug. 8, 2011) [hereinafter
Chiadzwa Torture Camp Exposed], http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/news/zimbabwe/
51591/chiadzwa-torture-camps-exposed.html.
19. Id.; Ford, supra note 4.
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Thus, the situation in Zimbabwe brought the conflict diamond
dilemma to a head: Zimbabwe is in compliance with the KPCS2o and is
yet responsible for gross human rights violations perpetrated for the
sake of diamonds.
In response to Zimbabwe receiving official certification under the
KPCS, the KP lost one of its most valued supporters. 21 In December
2011, Global Witness, an advocacy organization that helped establish
the KPCS, left the coalition. 22 According to Annie Dunnebacke, senior
campaigner for Global Witness, Zimbabwe is "the most egregious
situation that we've seen since the Kimberley Process was launched,
where diamonds have been fueling violence and human rights
violations . . . and the Kimberley Process has really failed to deal with
that effectively." 23 A year earlier, Martin Rapaport, Chairman of the
Rapaport Group and the associated Rapaport Diamond Trading
Network ("RapNet"), which is the world's largest diamond trading
network, made similar statements. 24 He called the KP a scam and told
the public that relying on KP Certificates alone does not guarantee that
such diamonds have not been associated with human rights abuses. 25
Between them, these groups assert powerful arguments that the KP
cannot, or will not, appropriately face the new realities of conflict
diamonds.
Is it time to give up on the KPCS? Does Global Witness's exit mark
the end of a failed project? Or is abandoning the scheme altogether
appropriate in light of its other successes? Regardless of how we
answer those questions, the situation in Zimbabwe remains deeply
troubling. Are these diamonds "conflict diamonds"? If not, are they not
yet still covered in blood? Perhaps most importantly, notwithstanding
the efficacy of the KPCS, what should the international community do
with regard to these issues?
This article seeks to address these questions. The situation is
extremely complex. Part I examines the KPCS in detail. It first looks
at the historical context that led to the KPCS. Each branch of the KP -
20. Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/03/worldlafricalzimbabwe-official-lauds-diamond-trade-
ruling.html?ref-diamonds.
21. Andersson, supra note 14.
22. John Eligon, Global Witness Quits Group on 'Blood Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 2011, at A5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/worldlafrica/global-
witness-quits-group-on-blood-diamonds.html?ref-diamonds.
23. Id.
24. Martin Rapaport, Stop Buying and Selling Blood Diamonds: The Kimberley
Process and World Diamond Council are a Sham, DLAMONDS.NET (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://www.diamonds.net/News/Newsltem.aspx?ArticleID=29578.
25. Id.
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diamond-producing states, representatives of the diamond industry,
and human rights activists - wanted this regulatory scheme for
different, sometimes competing, reasons. These reasons provide insight
into the KPCS's current situation. Part I continues by examining the
original structure and requirements of the KPCS (subsection B) and the
additions and developments it has achieved since (subsection C).
Finally, subsection D illustrates some of the KP's current statistics.
Part II describes Zimbabwe and its Marange diamond fields.
Initially, subsection A provides a brief description of Zimbabwe's
complicated political history. This background is important to
understand arguments regarding the KPCS's relation to the Marange
diamonds. Part II then provides a chronology of events related to
Marange - starting with the discovery in 2006 and continuing through
the present.
Part III illustrates the interactions between Zimbabwe and the KP
since 2006. It provides a timeline of the KP's actions and decisions
through the November 3, 2011 decision to certify Marange diamonds.
Additionally, Part III describes two arguments illustrating how
Zimbabwe violated the KPCS.
Part IV presents two currently proposed "solutions": to change
elements of the KPCS so it can prohibit diamonds like those from
Marange - diamonds that do not fit the definition of "conflict
diamonds," but cause the same harms - or to abandon the KPCS
altogether and take another route to regulate the diamond industry and
prevent financial gain from blood-covered diamonds.
Finally, Part V provides a brief analysis and recommendations, and
Part VI presents a conclusion. There is no simple answer to this
complicated problem. However, abandoning a regulatory scheme that,
with all its shortcomings, has successfully prevented certain illicit
diamonds from entering the market seems irresponsible. Further, as
the 2012 Chair, the United States ("U.S.") is now in a position to take a
leading role and lead the KP in more constructive directions. The
KPCS must learn from its own mistakes, observe other industries
attempts to emulate it, and work with the diamond industry to
establish additional workable compliance regulations. The KPCS failed
to keep Marange diamonds off the market; yet that failure does not
guarantee that it will inevitably fail forever.
VOL. 40:4652
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PART 1: THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
In 2003, the KPCS entered into force as a unique 26 approach to
regulating the diamond industry and combating associated atrocities
regarding "conflict diamonds."27 Regulation of international industries
- particularly the diamond industry, which has been notoriously
"opaque" - is difficult and frequently unsuccessful. 28 However, at that
particular time, with those particular players, everyone agreed on a
regulatory scheme. They made compromises and though details proved
more complex than ideal, the KPCS became a functional mechanism to
regulate diamonds.
A. Historical Context
An unusual combination of factors led to unlikely partners meeting
in Kimberley, South Africa for a common purpose. 29 Diamond-
producing states, mainly African, had witnessed the devastation caused
by diamond-fueled wars and wanted to find a politically acceptable end
- an end that did not name governments as guilty partners.3 0 At the
same time, the diamond industry, dominated by De Beers, recognized
its vulnerability to bad press; if consumers associated their product
with the African wars the industry was doomed.3 1 And human rights
activists and related NGOs recognized this moment as the time to act
and address as many of the diamond-related human rights abuses as
possible. 32 These partners, therefore, each had different goals for what
became the KPCS. 33
B. African States
By 2000, the African diamond-producing countries wanted peace.
Wars ravaged the African continent during the 1990s and early 2000s.3 4
26. Ann C. Wallis, Data Mining: Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United
Nations Development of Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 Nw. U. J.
INT'L HuM. RTs. 388, 390 (2005).
27. Id. at 388; Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and
Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDoZO L. REV. 1717, 1721 (2010).
28. Nikos Passas & Kimberly Jones, Commodities and Terrorist Financing: Focus on
Diamonds, 12 EUR. J. CRIM. POL'Y & RES. 1, 6 (2006).
29. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 388.
30. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1732.
31. Wallis, supra note 26, at 399-400.
32. Id. at 401.
33. See Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO
Obligations, and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLoBAL TRADE 1, 32-33 (2003).
34. Shannon K. Murphy, Clouded Diamonds: Without Binding Arbitration and More
Sophisticated Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, the Kimberley Process Will Ultimately Fail
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Fourteen African nations were at war in 1996 and, in that year alone,
these "account[ed] for more than half of all war-related deaths
worldwide and result[ed] in more than eight million refugees, returnees
and displaced persons."36 In many countries, rebel groups opposed to
the then-current governments captured resource-rich areas and used
diamonds to fund their violent campaigns. By 2003, an estimated 3.7
million Africans had died in diamond-funded wars and 6.5 million
people were driven from their homes.36 The most widely publicized of
these wars occurred in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo ("DRC").
C. Angola
From its independence in 1975 until 1989, Angola fought a bitter
civil war to determine which of two main political parties would govern
the new country.37 As with many other small nations at that time, this
political conflict provided a battleground for the world's super powers to
fight their Cold War.38 Movimiento Popular de Liberatacao de Angola
("MPLA"), backed by the Soviet Union, effectively seized control in 1975
against Uniao Nacional para la Indepencia Total de Angola ("UNITA"),
backed by the United States. 3 Although today the international
community recognizes MPLA as Angola's legitimate government and
the country is in a relative state of peace, UNITA still uses diamonds to
purchase illegal weapons. 40 In the 1990s, UNITA controlled the
diamond trade and diamond mines, which allowed the rebel group to
in Ending Conflicts Fueled by Blood Diamonds, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 207, 209
(2011).
35. U.N. Secretary-General, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable
Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General, 1 4, U.N.
Doc A/52/871-S/1998/318 (Apr. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Causes of Conflict]; Muna Ndulo,
The Democratization Process and Structural Adjustment in Africa, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 315, 315 (2003).
36. Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme: The First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond
Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 217, 231-32 (2005); see also Clean Diamond
Trade Act of 2003, 19 U.S.C. § 3901 (2011) [hereinafter CDTA].
37. Seth A. Malamut, A Band-Aid on a Machete Wound: The Failures of the
Kimberley Process and Diamond-Caused Bloodshed in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 25, 29 (2005); see also Angola, CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html (last
visited Apr. 7, 2012).
38. Causes of Conflict, supra note 35, 10; Edward R. Fluet, Comment, Conflict
Diamonds: U.S. Responsibility and Response, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 103, 105 (2005).
39. Malamut, supra note 37, at 30; Gretchen A. Vetter, Note, The Forgotten Million:
Assessing International Human Rights Abuses in the Artisanal Diamond Mining Industry,
16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 733, 738 (2007).
40. Murphy, supra note 34, at 210.
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finance the war through an estimated $4 billion from illicit diamond
sales.41 Over the course of the war, 500,000 died, 3.5 million were
displaced, and an additional 300,000 sought asylum in other
countries. 42
D. Sierra Leone
Some of the most prosperous diamond mines in the world funded
Sierra Leone's civil war from 1991 until 2002.43 The Revolutionary
United Front ("RUF') relied on controlling most of the country's
diamond mines to pay for its efforts to overthrow the government.44
RUF's brutal atrocities - primarily amputating limbs to prevent people
from mining diamonds to support the government 45 and burning
children and other civilians alive 46 - eventually received enough
attention to bring diamond-funded wars to the attention of the
international community. 47 The United Nations Security Council
sanctioned Sierra Leone and threatened a weapons embargo. 48
Eventually, the RUF was disarmed, but only after capturing five
hundred UN peacekeepers 49 and recruiting thousands of child soldiers
to fight their war. 50 The war killed between 50,000 and 75,000,
displaced 1.5 to 2.25 million, and forced 500,000 refugees to leave Sierra
Leone. 51 Today there are more UN peacekeeping troops patrolling
Sierra Leone's diamond mines than there are in any other part of the
world. 52
41. Joseph Hummel, Comment, Diamonds Are a Smuggler's Best Friend: Regulation,
Economics and Enforcement in the Global Effort to Curb the Trade in Conflict Diamonds,
41 INT'L LAW. 1145, 1155 (2007).
42. Jamila D. Holmes, The Kimberley Process: Evidence of Change in International
Law, 3 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 213, 215 (2007).
43. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1150; Malamut, supra note 37, at 30-31.
44. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1151 ("At one time during the civil war, the RUF
controlled nine-tenths of the country's diamond mines, generating between $25 and $125
million annually in diamond sales." (internal cites omitted)).
45. Transcript of Sorious Samura, CNN Presents: Return to Freetown (CNN television
broadcast Dec. 23, 2001), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS
/0112/23/cp.00.html.
46. Fluet, supra note 38, at 106; Margo Kaplan, Comment, Carats and Sticks:
Pursuing War and Peace Though the Diamond Trade, N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 559, 571
(2003).
47. Feldman, supra note 10, at 840.
48. Malamut, supra note 37, at 31.
49. Holmes, supra note 42, at 215.
50. Fluet, supra note 38, at 106.
51. Holmes, supra note 42, at 215.
52. Causes of Conflict, supra note 35, T 29; Murphy, supra note 34, at 211.
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E. The Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC provides a final example, though many more exist. In
what has been coined "Africa's World War," 53 an estimated 2.5 million
people died in the DRC between 1999 and 2003 alone.5 4 Many African
countries have participated in this war, including Zimbabwe, Chad,
Namibia, Angola, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda.5 5 Approximately $50
to $60 million in rough diamonds are smuggled out of the country each
year and continue to fund the conflict.56 And the war continues today.
The DRC is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural
resources, particularly diamonds.57 However, nearly eighty-five percent
of Congolese diamonds are smuggled out of the country, depriving the
country of at least $40 million in taxes at the lowest estimates. 58
Moreover, more than three million people have died since 199859 and
sixteen million people were reported starving in 2001.60
Each of these examples were all, at least mostly, civil wars, fought
between rebel groups and "legitimate" governments. This was essential
for the KPCS. Convincing countries to regulate their own natural
resources is very challenging. 61 Impoverished, undeveloped nations
with valuable natural resources have every incentive to sell to the
highest bidder. 62 During the 1990s in Africa, however, only rebels set
on revolution and overthrow benefited from the diamond wealth in
these countries. Their governments found regulating rebels' use of
diamond exports distinctively appealing.63
F. Diamond Industry
Certain characteristics of the diamond industry, as opposed to
other commodities, gave the KPSC a better chance of success than
53. Price, supra note 33, at 16.
54. Sally Hardcastle, Congo Pays the Price for War, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/1564653.stm.
55. Malamut, supra note 37, at 32.
56. Id. at 32-34 (noting that the diamonds are smuggled out of the DRC and into the
Republic of Congo ("ROC"), which has already established trade routes and low export
taxes).
57. Fishman, supra note 36, at 220; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1156.
58. Fishman, supra note 36, at 220-21; Price, supra note 33, at 26.
59. Fishman, supra note 36, at 223; Paul Orogun, "Blood Diamonds" and Africa's
Armed Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era, 166 WORLD AFF. 151, 157 (2004), available at
http://www.gpia.info/files/ul6/OrogunBloodDiamondsAfricasArmedConflicts.pdf.
60. Congo in Dire Trouble, Say Agencies, BBC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2001),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilworldlafrica/1477003.stm.
61. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1733-34.
62. See id. at 1723.
63. See id. at 1733.
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regulation schemes of other industries. This is initially
counterintuitive; the diamond industry is historically opaque and
difficult to regulate. 64 However, the industry was also a quasi-
monopoly controlled by De Beers; convince De Beers, and the entire
industry was on board.6 5
Diamonds are luxury items, whose value and sale depend
significantly on consumer opinion. 66 As Holly Burkhalter, then
advocacy director of Physicians for Human Rights said, the industry
knows that "diamonds have no intrinsic value, and they are not rare. If
the public learns to associate them with hacked-off limbs and the rape
of children, the notion of diamonds as a symbol of love could evaporate
forever."6 7 American consumers, just like the United Nations, noticed
those images of children with missing limbs and began associating
them with diamonds.6 8 Furthermore, human rights NGOs - Global
Witness and Partnership Africa Canada among them - threatened to
tarnish the entire diamond trade if De Beers did not participate in the
KPSC.69 Other groups, specifically People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals ("PETA"), had recently damaged the consumer fur industry
beyond repair. 70 De Beers recognized the very creditable threat.
Additionally, helping form the KPCS allowed De Beers to limit the
definition of "conflict diamond" and maintain the untarnished label of
all other diamonds. Moreover, this focus on distinguishing some
diamonds from others coincided with De Beer's new branding campaign,
which specifically identified the benefits of "De Beers Diamonds." 7 1
With the KPCS, they could add written guarantees their diamonds were
64. Id. at 1733-34 (citing Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6).
65. Wallis, supra note 26, at 400; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734; Nicholas Stein, The
De Beers Story: A New Cut on an Old Monopoly, FORTUNE, Feb. 19, 2001, at 186 (noting
that, while De Beers is still a major player, its hold on the industry is slipping); Erez
Yoeli, In December, Diamonds Are Forever: Empirical Evidence of Counter-Cyclical
Pricing in a Durable Goods Market 13-14 (May 12, 2003) (unpublished Honors
dissertation, Stanford University), available at http://economics.stanford.edulfiles/
Theses/Theses_2003/Yoeli.pdf.
66. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734 n.77 (citing Stefan Kanfer, The Last Empire: De
Beers, Diamonds, and the World 271 (1993) (stating that the first advertising campaign
De Beers ran attempted to convince Americans that "the Diamond Industry ... operates
fairly and in a manner that accords with American interests.")).
67. Holly Burkhalter, Deadly Diamonds, LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 18, 2000),
http://www.calbaptist.edu/dskubik/diamonds.htm.
68. Feldman, supra note 10, at 840-41.
69. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734.
70. Feldman, supra note 10, at 841; Holmes, supra note 42, at 231; Price, supra note
33, at 42.
71. Donna J. Bergenstock & James M. Maskulka, The De Beers Story: Are Diamonds
Forever?, 44 BuS. HORIZONS 37, 42 (2001); Feldman, supra note 10, at 866.
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"conflict-free."72 Without De Beer's participation, it is highly unlikely
that the KPSC could have ever come to fruition.73 De Beers controlled
virtually the entire industry and knew the risk it faced. It thus
concluded that some regulation, in this situation, was good for
business. 74
G. Activist Groups (Civil Society)
NGOs and other human rights organizations started reporting
diamond-related abuses years before they eventually convened the
meeting in Kimberley. Specifically, in 1998, Global Witness released a
report entitled A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and
Governments in the Angolan Conflict.7 5 The report specifically accused
De Beers of purchasing diamonds from Angolan rebels.76 Other NGOs
quickly joined the cause; a European NGO-led campaign, "Fatal
Transactions Campaign,"7 7 and Partnership Africa Canada's The Heart
of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security78 proved
particularly persuasive.
Together these groups effectively threatened an international
campaign to convince consumers that diamonds were the "physical
embodiment of human rights abuses." 79 PETA's recent success enabled
activists to simply note the unmistakable similarities between the two
luxury items. However, unlike the fur industry, which necessitates
killing animals, only a small percentage of the global diamond trade
involved blood diamonds. s0 People can safely mine diamonds and
overseers do not always commit abuses.8 1 Additionally, diamonds can
be a source of natural wealth for the often-impoverished nations that
mine them. 82 Therefore, the active NGOs at the time compromised with
72. Wallis, supra note 26, at 400.
73. See Holmes, supra note 40, at 216-17.
74. Wallis, supra note 26, at 399-400; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1734-35.
75. GLOBAL WITNESS, A ROUGH TRADE: THE ROLE OF COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENTS
IN THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1998) [hereinafter A ROUGH TRADE], available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ARough Trade.pdf.
76. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 392.
77. Id.
78. IAN SMILLIE ET AL, PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE HEART OF THE MATTER:
SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY (2000), available at http://www.pac
web.org/Documents/diamondsKP/heart of the-matter-full-2000-Oleng.pdf.
79. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1737.
80. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl. (stating that conflict diamonds should not be allowed
to "negatively affect the trade in legitimate diamonds, which makes a critical contribution
to the economies of many of the producing, processing, exporting and importing states,
especially developing states").
81. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1738.
82. Fluet, supra note 38, at 105-06.
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diamond-producing states and De Beers, and framed the issue of
"conflict diamonds" such that it did not incorporate all violations
committed for the stones, but took an important step in the right
direction.
This compromise was essential for the KPCS. Without limiting
"conflict diamonds" to a small percentage of all diamonds, De Beers
would have backed out; without focusing on rebel movements' use of
diamonds, the governments would not have agreed. Yet this
compromise received significant criticism over the years83 and recently
prevented the KP from banning Marange diamonds.
Against this complicated background, the KPSC came into being.
May 2000 saw strange bedfellows cooperating to resolve the "blood
diamond problem."84 In December 2000, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously voted to support the KPSC.8 Two years later,
on January 1, 2003, thirty-nine diamond-trading countries adopted and
implemented the scheme.86
H. Original KPCS Requirements
The details of the KPCS are codified in the original document. The
Preamble recognizes "the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by
trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in
affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations
that have been perpetrated in such conflicts."87 The KPCS then sets
out standards and a process by which rough diamonds produced in
member states (Participants) are evaluated and certified. 88 If a
shipment of rough diamonds contains a Kimberley Certificate, that
certificate (theoretically) provides that the country of origin has 1)
established "internal controls designed to eliminate the presence of
conflict diamonds" imported to or exported from that country, enforced
through domestic laws and penalties; 89 2) imported and exported all
rough diamonds in tamper resistant containers;90 and 3) not imported
or exported any rough diamonds to or from a non-Participant state.9 1
In theory, as more Participants join the Scheme, fewer markets will
83. See Wallis, supra note 26, at 388; see infra note 96.
84. KP Website, supra note 4.
85. See G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. AIRES/55/56 (Jan. 29, 2001), available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docfUNDOC/GEN/NOO/562/75/PDF/N0056275.pdfOpen
Element; Murphy, supra note 34, at 214.
86. Fishman, supra note 36, at 224-25.
87. KPCS, supra note 5, at 1.
88. Id. at 6-11.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. at 6.
91. Id.
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exist for non-certified diamonds. This will decrease the value of non-
certified diamonds, while preserving the legitimate diamond trade. In
addition, Participants agree to make all decisions regarding
participation in the KPCS and resolve all disputes that may arise by
consensus. 92 The original document sets out the bare-bones framework
of a dispute resolution process, but the details and mechanisms are
vague and imprecise.93
The original KPCS was met with severe criticism at the outset.
Critics focused on the vague language, 94 the nearly impossible
requirement of complete consensus, 9 5 the gap in regulation between
mine and export, 96 the fact that virtually all "obligations" are, in fact,
voluntary,9 7 and on the complete lack of an enforcement mechanism.98
However, the greatest - and most consistent and still ongoing -
criticism regards the definition of the very thing the KPCS seeks to
eliminate: conflict diamonds.99
The KPCS's primary goal is to eliminate "conflict diamonds" from
the market, thereby cutting the link between diamonds and the warfare
they funded, while simultaneously preserving the legitimate diamond
trade. 100 According to the KPCS, conflict diamonds are "rough
diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict
aimed at undermining legitimate governments." 101 If particular
diamonds do not meet every aspect of this definition, yet still contribute
to serious human rights abuses and crimes, they are not conflict
diamonds and the KPCS cannot regulate them.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Fluet, supra note 38, at 112; Murphy, supra note 34, at 218.
95. The Marange Diamond Fields - an Overview, THIS IS ZIMBABWE - SOKWANELE
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.sokwanele.com/thisiszimbabwe/archives/7074.
96. Vetter, supra note 39, at 746.
97. Fluet, supra note 38, at 116; Malamut, supra note 37, at 47-49; Murphy, supra
note 34, at 219-20.
98. Fishman, supra note 36, at 218; Holmes, supra note 42, at 226; Hummel, supra
note 41, at 1164; Wallis, supra note 26, at 403.
99. See, e.g., Tina Muscarella Gooch, Conflict Diamonds or Illicit Diamonds: Should
the Difference Matter to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme?, 48 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 189, 190 (2008); Vetter, supra note 39, at 766; Mark Kersten, Justice and Diamonds in
Zimbabwe: Saving Kimberley from Itself, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Oct. 10, 2011),
http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/10/10/justice-and-diamonds-in-zimbabwe-saving-kim
berley-from-itselfl.
100. KPCS, supra note 5, at 1-2; see also infra notes 192-97.
101. KPCS, supra note 5, at 3.
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L KPCS Additions and Developments
The KPCS and its associated requirements have developed.
Notably, the original document itself does not prohibit alterations,
improvements or amendments.10 2 Certain subsequent actions indicate
the KPCS scope can expand. 103
In 2004, KP members formed a new ad hoc group on Artisanal-
Alluvial Production to address concerns about how local diggers operate
in illicit diamond trade. 104 This is now an official Working Group,
which also addresses concerns about the mine's environmental
conditions and how this affects miners' health, matters not addressed in
the original KP document. 105
In addition, the KP works with both the Diamond Development
Initiative ("DDI") and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative, to examine broader issues involving the diamond industry.
The DDI aims to "address, in a comprehensive way, the political, social
and economic challenges facing the artisanal diamond mining sector in
order to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal
diamond mining to miners and their communities . . . ." 106 The
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative seeks to decrease
governmental corruption and help local populations benefit from their
own natural resources by publicizing government revenue figures. 107
102. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1736-37.
103. See, e.g., Zimbabwe Diamond Trade Under Spotlight, VOICE OF AMERICA (Nov. 3,
2009), available at http://wwwl.voanews.comlenglish/news/a-13-2009-11-03-voa49.html
(quoting Ian Smillie, who helped design the KPCS as saying "nobody could imagine at the
beginning of this thing that human rights were going to become a problem in the
diamonds fields of the countries that are members. But it is an issue and I think this is
the beginning of a more mature Kimberley Process that can deal with some of the
fundamental issues that consumers are concerned about.").
104. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1739-40; Global Witness, Making It Work: Why the
Kimberley Process Must Do More to Stop Conflict Diamonds, GLOBAL WITNESS 15 (Nov.
2005), http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/GWMaking-iLwork.pdf
[hereinafter Making It Work]; Global Witness & Partnership Africa Canada,
Implementing the Kimberley Process 5 (June 2005), http://www.globalwitness.org
/sites/default/files/import/Implementing%/o20the%20Kimberley%2OProcess%20-%2OJune%
202005.pdf [hereinafter Implementing the Kimberley Process].
105. KIMBERLEY PROCESS PLENARY MEETING, GABORONE, BOTS., Nov. 6-9, 2006, FINAL
COMMUNIQUt 1-3 (2006) [hereinafter GABORONE PLENARY COMMUNIQUt], available at
http://www.state.gov/documentsorganization/77110.pdf- Wexler, supra note 27, at 1739-
40.
106. Vetter, supra note 39, at 759; DDI Mission Statement, Diamond Development
Initiative, http://www.ddiglobal.org/pages/mission.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
107. What Is the EITI?, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE,
http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
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The KP works with each of these organizations and functions as a
liaison between them. 108
The KP also works with the World Diamond Council ("WDC"),
which is one of the first two non-governmental Observers invited to
participate in the KP (Global Witness was the other).109 The WDC was
created in 2000 to represent the diamond industry's interests during
formation of the KPCS. 110 Eli Izhakoff, a veteran in the diamond
industry, was elected chairman and formed a broad coalition, bringing
important players from national and international industry
organizations, major jewelry manufacturers and retailers, mining
companies, gem labs, and bank representatives to the WDC table."' In
2000, the WDC devised and utilized a system of warrantees to
supplement the KP certificates. 112 That system requires that all
diamond traders, polishers, dealers, and manufacturers confirm "[t]he
diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources
not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations
resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are
conflict free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees
provided by the supplier of these diamonds."ll 3 While these warrantees
really parallel the KPCS requirements, the WDC requirements are
directed more specifically at industry players and are intended to work
in conjunction with them.114
Finally, the KP further extended its own system of monitoring
compliance. Originally, the KPCS required only self-monitoring by
individual participants through reports on each country's own "relevant
laws, regulations, rules, procedures and practices." 115 Eventually,
participants agreed to peer reviews of individual states conducted by
teams including representatives from each branch of the KP.11 Now,
the KP periodically reviews the entire scheme as a whole group.117
108. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1740.
109. Feldman, supra note 10, at 850-51.
110. See History, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org
about-wdc/history (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter WDC Website].
111. Id.; Feldman, supra note 10, at 850.
112. See Fishman, supra note 36, at 227; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1160; Mission
Statement, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.worlddiamondcouncil.org/aboutwdc
/mission-statement (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
113. See THE WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTING THE
KIMBERLEY PROCESS 5 (2003), available at http://www.jvclegal.org/KimberleyProcess.pdf.
114. Michael Maggi, The Currency of Terrorism: An Alternative way to Combat
Terrorism and End the Trade of Conflict Diamonds, 15 PACE INT'L L. REV. 513, 533
(2003).
115. KPCS, supra note 5, § V(a).
116. Wexler, supra note 22, at 1745.
117. Id.
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These steps expanded the initial enforcement mechanisms and
demonstrate that, while steps may be small and slow, the KPCS is
capable of growth and development.
J. Current KPCS Statistics
Currently, forty-nine member states representing seventy-five
countries (the European Union is an individual Participant) are part of
the KPSC and subject to its requirements. 118 These Participants
produce approximately 99.8 percent of all the rough diamonds in the
world. 119 Though Africa remains the world's poorest and most
underdeveloped continent, 120 sixty-five of the world's diamonds
originate in Africa and Africa exports approximately $8.5 billion in
diamonds each year. 121 According to the official website - and there is
only limited disagreement - the KPCS has been extremely successful at
achieving its stated goal: "Diamond experts estimate that conflict
diamonds now represent a fraction of one percent of the international
trade in diamonds, compared to estimates of up to fifteen percent in the
1990s."122 Even Partnership Africa Canada, which frequently criticizes
KP Participants' behavior, acknowledges that the diamonds the KPSC
sought to eliminate are now virtually non-existent in the legitimate
diamond trade. 123 Furthermore, the market value of non-certified,
illicit diamonds has fallen. 124 It is difficult to argue with these
numbers; so far as its stated goals (and accepted definitions) are
concerned, the KPCS has been a success.
118. WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, Countries Participating in the Kimberley Process,
http://www.diamondfacts.org/pdfs/conflict/KimberleyProcessParticipants.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2012).
119. See Ford, supra note 4; KP Website, supra note 4.
120. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: SUSTAINABILITY
AND EQUITY - A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL, 19-20, U.N. Sales No. 11.III.B.1 (2011),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR 2011_ENSummary.pdf- Mark Doyle,
Why is the African Continent Poor?, BBC NEWS (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8215083.stm.
121. See Diamond Facts, WORLD DIAMOND COUNCIL, http://www.diamondfacts.org/
facts/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
122. See KP Website, supra note 4.
123. THE DIAMONDS & HUMAN SEC. PROJECT, P'SHIP AFR. CAN., KILLING KIMBERLEY?
CONFLICT DIAMONDS AND PAPER TIGERS 3 (Jos6e L~tourneau & Ian Smillie eds., rev. ed.
2006) [hereinafter KILLING KIMBERLEY], available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents
/diamonds KP/15_KillingKimberley Revised%20EditionEng-Nov2006.pdf.
124. AD Hoc WORKING GROUP ON THE REVIEW OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
CERTIFICATION SCHEME, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME THIRD YEAR
REVIEW 21 (Oct. 2006) [hereinafter KPCS THIRD YEAR REVIEW], available at
http://www.gjepc.org/pdfl /trade information/KPCS_3rdYear reviewFinal report.pdf.
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Its greatest test, according to scholars and activists alike, was how
it would handle Zimbabwe's Marange Diamonds.125
PART II: ZIMBABWE'S MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS
The diamonds from Marange do not fit comfortably within the KP's
codified scope; no rebel group uses these diamonds to fund war. And
yet, assuming the allegations are true, similar atrocities are happening
today in Marange as happened during the 1990s in Sierra Leone.
Furthermore, while no "rebel movement" is directly linked to the
Marange diamonds, Zimbabwe's government faces significant
opposition.
A. Zimbabwe's Political History
A complete account of Zimbabwe's political drama over the past
decades is well beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief sketch
is necessary to understand the intersection between Marange and the
KPCS. Zimbabwe achieved independence from Britain in 1980.
Though there was initial competition, current president Robert Mugabe
and his Zimbabwe African National Union ("ZANU") party maintained
an uninterrupted, though violent, rule for twenty-eight years. 126
Following a horrific period of massacres between 1982 and 1985, ZANU
and its main political opposition, the Zimbabwe African People's Union
("ZAPU"), reached an agreement, which merged the two parties,
creating ZANU-PF and maintaining Mugabe's presidency. 127
Zimbabwe's economy suffered catastrophic damage as President
Mugabe focused on maintaining control. This triggered further
opposition to ZANU-PF. The Movement for Democratic Change
("MDC"), led by Morgan Tsvangirai and established in 1999, rapidly
gained support and effectively challenged President Mugabe.128 The
ZANU-PF government responded by further suppressing civil liberties
and intimidating its way through multiple fraudulent elections. 129
125. Thierry Vircoulon, Time to Rethink the Kimberley Process: The Zimbabwe Case,
INT'L CRISIS GRP. (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/southern-
africalzimbabwe/op-eds/time-to-rethink-the-kimberley-process-the-zimbabwe-case.aspx.
126. Id.
127. See Zimbabwe Profile, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-africa-14113618.
128. Vircoulon, supra note 125.
129. INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT No. 93, POST-ELECTION ZIMBABWE: WHAT
NEXT? 1-2 (June 7, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/
africalsouthern-africa/zimbabwe/Post-Election%20Zimbabwe%2OWhat%2ONext.pdf.
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"Operation Restore Order" effectively displaced 700,000 mostly poor
MDC supporters from Harare, Zimbabwe's capital city.130
In the 2008 presidential elections, Tsvangirai received the most
votes, but not enough to secure the office after the first round of
Zimbabwe's electoral process.13 ZANU-PF's response was so violent,
immediate, and widespread that Tsvangirai withdrew. 132 However,
international pressure eventually convinced the leaders to establish a
transitional power-sharing agreement, in which Mugabe retained the
presidency and Tsvangirai became prime minister.133 Since September
15, 2008, this hotly contested and extremely controversial coalition has
been Zimbabwe's legitimate government.134 Regardless of the on-going
tensions between the two parties and the persistent divides, the
military forces that control the Marange diamond fields technically
answer to Zimbabwe's legitimate government. Therefore, according to
the KPCS and international law, Zimbabwe itself, not a particular
group, controls and uses the Marange diamonds.
B. Discovering the Diamond Fields
In 2006, local villagers discovered the Marange diamond fields in
the Chiadzwa district near the Zimbabwe/Mozambique border.135 These
fields are rich with alluvial deposits, which, in total, have an estimated
worth of up to U.S. $800 billion and could be a viable source of wealth
for the next 80 years. 136 For a country like Zimbabwe, which has
suffered from a crippled economy for decades, such a find could have
ushered in a new period of growth and prosperity.137 Unfortunately,
130. INT'L CRISIS GRP., AFRICA REPORT No. 122, ZIMBABWE: AN END TO THE
STALEMATE? 4 (Mar. 5, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africal
southernafricalzimbabwe/Zimbabwe%20An%2OEnd%20to%20the%20Stalemate.pdf.
131. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2; Zimbabwe: Tsuangirai Wins Parliamentary Vote,
ALLAFRICA (Aug. 25, 2008), http://allafrica.com/stories/200808251079.html.
132. See Tsvangirai Withdrawal: Key Quotes, BBC NEWS (June 23, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil7468091.stm.
133. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Rivals Strike a Bargain to Share Power, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/worldlafrica/12zimbabwe.html?em.
134. LAUREN PLOCH, ZIMBABWE: THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR U.S. POLICY 2-4 (Oct. 27, 2011), available at /www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34509.pdf.
135. Alan Cowell, Group Allows Limited Sale of Zimbabwe's Diamonds, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/world/africa/17diamonds.html;
Ecologist, Export of Zimbabwean Diamonds Threatens Ethical Jewellery Trade,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uklenvironment/2011/aug/08/zimbab
wean-diamonds-ethical-jewellery-trade.
136. Ecologist, supra note 135.
137. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1723.
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this did not happen.13 8 Some scholars examine this fact in light of the
modern economic concept of "resource curses." 139 Resource curses
"occur when an open market and an abundance of natural resources
combine to create or exacerbate a governance problem" - such as
internal conflicts.140 Marange diamonds are such a curse.
The Marange fields are unique in Zimbabwe; miners reach these
diamonds without complicated tools or expensive extraction methods.141
Rather than give private companies exclusive rights to these fields, 142
the government initially opened them and unlicensed miners
descended.143 Between late 2006 and October 2008, police financially
and physically exploited the miners; "killings, torture, beatings and
harassment," 144 as well as arbitrary arrests and detentions of local
miners were common. By the end of this period, the police established
elaborate syndicates to systematically increase the bribes they
demanded from miners.145 Then, in the summer of 2007, reports from
Zimbabwe indicated the illegal mining was under control. 146
However, tens of thousands of illegal diamond miners returned to
Marange in the last months of 2008. 147 In October 2008, the
Zimbabwean government sent in military forces - whether to combat
138. The discovery of significant alluvial diamond deposits in the Marange area of
eastern Zimbabwe [Manicaland Province] in June 2006 should have been a means of
salvation for the virtually bankrupt country after ten years of chaos that saw world record
inflation and the nation brought to its knees. Instead, it has led to greed, corruption and
exploitation on a grand scale, the use of forced labour - both adults and children -
horrifying human rights abuses, brutal killings, degradation of the environment and
massive enrichment of a select few; SOKWANELE, supra note 95, at 2.
139. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1723; Kersten, supra note 99.
140. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1718.
141. Alluvial diamonds do not require the same type of deep mines as kimberlite
deposits and are significantly easier to extract. Vetter, supra note 39, at 742. THE
DIAMONDS & HUMAN SEc. PROJECT, P'SHIP AFR. CAN., ZIMBABWE, DIAMONDS AND THE
WRONG SIDE OF HISTORY 3 (Jos4e Ltourneau & Ian Smillie eds., 2009) [hereinafter
ZIMBABWE, DIAMONDS AND HISTORY], available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents
/diamonds_KP/18Zimbabwe-DiamondsMarchO9-Eng.pdf.
142. African Consolidated Resources ("ACR"), British company, initially received
exclusive rights to the fields, but the Zimbabwe government revoked ACR's license when
they realized the extent of the Marange field's value. See Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
143. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2 (stating this discovery "unleashed a diamond rush
of 15,000 to 20,000 unlicensed artisanal miners and uncontrolled smuggling").
144. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE
MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS OF ZIMBABWE 19 (2009) [hereinafter DIAMONDS IN THE
ROUGH]. Critics regularly claim that reports from this type of organization is biased,
however newspaper articles (many cited below) suggest that much of this report is
accurate.
145. Id. at 21; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
146. See Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
147. DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH, supra note 144, at 27.
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the existing lawlessness or as a reward for dedication to Mugabe is
debated.148 The military initiated "Operation Hakudzokwi" (No Return)
on October 27, 2008. 149 Within three weeks, army helicopters and
soldiers shot miners and villagers indiscriminately in an attempt to
clear the area.150 The operation ended with more than 200 dead.151
Military forces smuggled diamonds, generally through Mozambique (a
non-KP Participant),152 and utilized forced child labor.15 3
C. Marange Today
The abuses continue.154 In addition to the BBC reports of torture
camps,15 5 the military forces, still in Marange,15 6 are allegedly involved
in illegal digging, trading, and smuggling.157 Local Focal Point ("LFP"),
a group established by the KP's Working Group on Monitoring to
independently monitor Zimbabwe, reported that security guards
protecting the Mbada mine in Marange set dogs on illegal miners,
children, and elderly villagers between August and October, 2011.158 In
response to the November announcement that KP officially lifted its
ban on Zimbabwe,159 Shamiso Mtisi, Coordinator of LFP, stated "[t]his
deal only reinforces the perception that there is no limit to how far the
KP is prepared to go in lowering the ethical bar on Marange .... Given
the chance to keep Zimbabwe to its previous commitments, the KP has
148. Id. at 29; Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
149. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
150. DIAMONDS IN THE ROUGH, supra note 144, at 30-34; Nokuthula Sibanda,
Zimbabwe: Harare Denies Diamond Field Abuses, RELIEFWEB (June 30, 2009),
http://reliefweb.int/node/315325.
151. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 2.
152. Zimbabwe: End Repression in Marange Diamond Fields, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(June 26, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/26/zimbabwe-end-repression-marange-
diamond-fields.
153. David Smith, Children Forced to Mine Zimbabwe Diamonds, GUARDIAN (June 26,
2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/26/zimbabwe-diamonds-children-
mugabe ("It is estimated that up to 300 children continue to work for soldiers in the
diamond fields.").
154. Veneranda Langa, Mbada Diamonds Guards Brutalise Villagers: Report, NEWS
DAY (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2011-11-07-mbada-diamonds-
guards-brutalise-villagers-report.
155. See supra notes 1-17.
156. Despite agreeing to withdraw all troops under the Joint Working Agreement.
Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4.
157. Langa, supra note 154.
158. Id.; Marange Diamonds: Zimbabwe Denies 'Torture Camp', BBC NEWS (Aug. 9,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14468116 [hereinafter Marange
Diamonds].
159. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
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shown itself incapable of doing the right thing." 160 Human rights
abuses in Marange have decreased. 16 1 However, a reduction that leaves
abuses such as these in place is decidedly insufficient.
PART III: ZIMBABWE'S CERTIFICATION STATUS
Human rights activists immediately reported the first abuses and
the KP responded. 162 Their responses never satisfied the activists,
however. They consistently argued the KP could and should do more.
Yet, the steps the KP took and its eventual decision in November
clearly indicate that the KP does not believe it has any authority to
regulate the Marange diamonds.
A. KPCS Reactions - A Timeline
Human rights groups directly associated with the KP began
documenting the situation at Marange as early as 2006.163 Zimbabwe
denied any misconduct. 164 The KP responded with limited action: a
peer review visit in June 2007 indicated Zimbabwe had sufficiently
implemented KPCS minimum requirements and the abuse accusations
were not mentioned. 165 The following year, KP expressed "growing
concerns" about the Marange fields and recommended additional
monitoring. 166
160. Civil Society Activists Criticise Diamond Deal, SADOCC (Nov. 2, 2011),
http://www.sadocc.at/news/2011/2011-232.shtml.
161. Langa, supra note 154.
162. See Ecologist, supra note 135.
163. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771; Zimbabwe and its Diamonds: Forever Dirty,
ECONOMIST (June 30, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18898238.
164. Edahn Golan, KP Meeting: Renewed Calls for Improvements in Monitoring as KP
Fails Where it's Critical, IDEX (June 25, 2009), http://www.idexonline.
com/portalFullNews.asp?id=32542; Marange Diamonds, supra note 158.
165. [T]hrough a dedicated and comprehensive effort, the Government of Zimbabwe
has managed to bring th[e] situation under control in the first half of 2007 . . . . It is the
view of the review team that the overall structure of the implementation of the [KPCS]
appears to be working in a satisfactory manner in Zimbabwe, and, in general, meets the
minimum requirements of the KPCS. Kimberley Process, Review Visit, Zimb., May 29-
June 1, 2007, Summary of the Report of the KP Review Visit to Zimbabwe 2, available at
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberleyprocess/annualreports;jsessionid=471AC
C601453D3FDB607AE56637E5D11?p p id=110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3&p-plifecyc
le=0&p-p state=normal&p-pmode=view&p-p-col id=column2&p-pcol-count=2&_110
INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3_struts action=%2Fdocumentlibrary-display%2Fviewfile_e
ntry&_110INSTANCE7D81ln2qTtl3_redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kimberleyproces
s.com%2Fweb%2Fkimberley-process%2Fannualreports%3Bjsessionid%3D471ACC601
453D3FDB607AE56637E5D11%3Fp-p-id%3D110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3%26p plif
ecycle%3DO%26p p-state%3Dnormal%26p p-mode%3Dview%26p-p col id%3Dcolumn-
2%26p_p_col count %3D2&_110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtI3_fileEntryld=17256.
166. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771.
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In June 2009, a review mission to Zimbabwe reported that it was
not compliant. 6 7 Their report recommended suspension and declared
that Zimbabwe must withdraw its army and immediately suspend all
illegal mining and sales. 168 At the November 2009 KP plenary meeting,
Zimbabwe and other Participants agreed on a Joint Work Plan. 169
Under this plan, Zimbabwe agreed to a ban on their exports until
monitors were in place and the government had demonstrated
progress.170 Progress was insufficient.
In 2010, a special monitor visited Zimbabwe and the Marange
fields twice. At the plenary meeting that June, the monitor reported
Zimbabwe was compliant, but the vote to adopt the report's
recommendation ended in a stalemate.171 The group agreed to meet
again the following month in Russia. Following that meeting, KP
authorized two sales of Marange diamonds.172 These sales involved
900,000 carats of diamonds worth $72 million and were met with
disapproval from the United States, European Union, Canada and
Australia. 173 No real progress occurred during the following year.
Then, on June 23, 2011, Mr. Mathieu Yamba, the then-K]P Chair
announced that Zimbabwe could sell from two specific mines in
Marange and that others would soon follow.174 Representatives of every
NGO present walked out of the meeting in protest. 75 The United
States and other Western countries declared the decision invalid
because it was not unanimous.17 6 While this led to confusion, even from
167. Sebastien Berger & Peta Thornycroft, Mugabe Escapes a Blood Diamond Ban,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Nov. 6, 2009, at 21.
168. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4.
169. KIMBERLEY PROCESS, JOINT WORK PLAN: ZIMBABWE 1 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/133851.pdf [hereinafter JOINT WORK PLAN];
Celia W. Dugger, Group Won't Suspend Zimbabwe on Mining Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/07/worldlafrica/07zimbabwe.html.
170. Vircoulon, supra note 125, at 4; Zim Won't Export Marange Diamonds, FIN.
GAZETTE (Zimb.) (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/top-stories/2081-zim-
wont-export-marange-diamonds.html.
171. Arthur Bright, Zimbabwe Restarts Diamond Sales Amid 'Blood Diamond'
Accusations, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONITOR (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/terrorism-security/2010/0812/Zimbabwe-restarts-diamond-sales-amid-blood-
diamond-accusations.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Chair's Notice of 23 June 2011 on the Zimbabwe Issue, in 35 OTHER FACETS Aug.
2011, at 2, available at http://www.pacweb.org/Documents/Other-Facets/OF35-eng.pdf.
175. Statement by Charmian Gooch, Founding Dir., Global Witness (June 27, 2011),
available at http://www.globalwitness.org/library/global-witness-founding-director%E
2%80%99s-statement-ngo-coalition-walk-out-kimberley-process; Kersten, supra note 99.
176. Statement by Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign
Affairs & Sec. Pol'y (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http://appablog.wordpress.com/2011/11
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Zimbabwe's finance minister, Tendai Biti, 177 more Zimbabwe diamonds
entered the market. Finally, on November 3, 2011, the KP's ban on
Marange diamonds was officially lifted - Marange diamond fields are
now certified and part of the legitimate diamond trade.17 8
B. Possible Violations
Zimbabwe's actions may have violated the KPCS in two distinct
ways. The first involves its failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the Scheme. The second directly addresses the abuses
committed to obtain these stones. This second argument can proceed in
either of two ways - 1) by forcing Marange diamonds into the existing
definition or 2) by relying on the underlying principles behind the
KPCS.
C. Exporting to Non-Participant State
KPCS Participants must meet certain minimal requirements to
remain in compliance and legally participate in the legitimate diamond
trade. Zimbabwe violated many of these basic requirements.
Zimbabwe diamonds arrive in Mozambique daily.17 9 Mozambique
neither produces diamonds itself, nor is a member of the KPCS.18o In
Vila de Manica, just across the eastern Zimbabwe border, the illegal
diamond trade flourishes with the complicity of both Zimbabwean and
Mozambican officials. 181 A Mozambican man living in Zimbabwe freely
admitted to a reporter that he walks across the border nearly every day
/01/statement-by-the-spokesperson-of-high-representative-catherine-ashton-on-the-agree
ment-reached-in-kimberley-process-regarding-marange-diamonds/; Zimbabwe: Rampant
Abuses in Marange Diamond Fields, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 30, 2011),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/30/zimbabwe-rampant-abuses-marange-diamond-fields;
Ecologist, supra note 135.
177. Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Diamond Exports Approved Over Objections, N.Y.
TIMES (June 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/worldlafrica/25zimbabwe.
html.
178. Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
179. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 222; Cletus Mushanawani, Zimbabwe:
Mozambique's Diamond Capital, HERALD (July 14, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/
201007140397.html; Vircoulon, supra note 125.
180. Participants, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/weblkim
berley-process/kp-participants (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).
181. Alex Bell, Zimbabwe: Army Leading Smuggling Operations Out of Chiadzwa, SW
RADIO AFR. (London) (July 26, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201007261469.html;
Sarah Childress, Diamond Trade Finds Regulatory Loophole in Mozambique, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 6, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125738837197329995.html; Tamas S. Kiss,
Illicit Trade Zimbabwean Blood Diamond Trade Continues, BUDAPEST REP. (Aug. 4,
2010), http://www.budapestreport.com/2010/08/04/illicit-trade-zimbabwean-blood-diamond
-trade-continues/; Vircoulon, supra note 125, at C.
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to sell diamonds to Lebanese buyers. 182 Traders from Israel, Somalia,
Nigeria, and Guinea reportedly make a great living in Manica, another
border town in Mozambique.18 3
The KPCS explicitly states that Participants cannot export to non-
Participants. 8 4 The complications surrounding the KPCS definition of
"conflict diamond" is irrelevant here because the KPCS bans
exportation of all "rough diamonds," which includes any "diamonds that
are unworked or simply sawn, cleaved or bruted . . . ."185 Furthermore,
the Zimbabwe diamonds arrive in Mozambique carried in pockets
without a valid KPCS certificate and clearly not in any type of "tamper-
resistant containers."18 6 Zimbabwe thereby violated sections 11(a) and
IV(c) as well. 187
These facts are not in dispute; they are not even discussed.
Undoubtedly, the issue of human rights violations is more important
and more pressing.188 Yet, these procedural violations are clear and far
less controversial. It might have been easy for the KP to justify its ban
on Marange diamonds in light of these violations. Of course, KP Chair
Yamba declared Zimbabwe in compliance and the ban is now entirely
lifted. 189 Furthermore, Zimbabwe argued that it complied with the
Joint Work Plan and other requirements under the KPCS. 190 Any
further recommendations by the KP are just that - unenforceable
recommendations, which Zimbabwe is under no legal obligation to
fulfill. However, the ban could be re-imposed and the United States
182. Childress, supra note 181.
183. Id.
184. KPCS, supra note 5, § III(c).
185. Id. § I.
186. Id. §§ 11(a), IV(c).
187. Id.
188. Although KP investigators themselves have argued that this type of smuggling
operation creates illicit trading routes, which undermines the security of legitimate
international trading. See Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770-71 (citing Celia W. Dugger, War
Against Diamond Smuggling Is on the Line, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 5, 2009, at 2
(quoting a confidential Kimberley Process report)).
189. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
190. Summary of the Report of the KP Review Visit to Zimbabwe, Kimberly Process
(May 29 - June 1, 2007), available at http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-
process/annualreports?ppid=110INSTANCE&7D81ln2qTtI3&p_pjifecycle=0&p-p stt
e-normal&pp mode=view&p.p.colid=column2&p_pcol count=2&_110_INSTANCE_7
D81 ln2qTtl3_struts action=%2Fdocument_1ibrary-display%2Fview file entry&_110 IN
STANCE_7D81 ln2qTtl3 redirect=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.kimberleyprocess.com%2Fweb
%2Fkimberley-process%2Fannualreports%3Fppjd%3D11i0INSTANCE_7D81ln2q Ttl3
%26pp_1ifecycle%3DO%26p pstate%3Dnormal%26p-p-mode%3Diew%26p-p colid%3
Dcolumn2%26p.pscol count%3D2&_110_INSTANCE_7D81ln2qTtl3_fileEntryId=17256.
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took over the Chair in 2012.191 This presents a prime opportunity for
the United States to act on its stated disgust over economically
motivated human rights violations.
D. Human Rights Violations
While Zimbabwe is violating some technical KPCS requirements,
the bigger concern is obviously the human rights abuses that facilitate
the trade of Marange stones. Scholars and activists have presented two
different arguments as to how these abusive acts violate the KPCS.
The primary issue is whether Marange diamonds can be excluded from
trade under the KPCS. The only such diamonds are "conflict
diamonds." As stated above, the KPCS definition of conflict diamonds is
"rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments . . . ."192 Since
no rebel groups use Marange diamonds to fund conflicts against state
governments, Zimbabwe and now the KP insist that Marange diamonds
cannot be conflict diamonds.193
This result is profoundly unsettling. How can diamonds obtained
through child labor, torture, and murder not be blood diamonds?
E. Marange Diamonds as KPCS Conflict Diamonds
Recognizing the difficulty in actually changing the definition of
"conflict diamonds," some seek to fit the situation in Zimbabwe into a
"typical" KPCS violation so the KP can exclude Marange diamonds from
the market. They avoid the rebel concern all together and argue that
while these diamonds may not be undermining a particular
government, the fact that illicit smuggling leads to illegal trade
channels hreatens the security of international trading itself. 194 The
response: these are still not conflict diamonds.
A more crafty and ambitious argument involves Zimbabwe's
prolonged political instability. According to this line of reasoning,
Zimbabwe's legitimate government is the coalition government formed
in 2008, when Tsvangirai became prime minister. 195 Many reports
indicate that the troops controlling Marange are loyal to Mugabe alone
191. Ford, supra note 6; Jeff Miller, U.S. to Chair Kimberley Process in 2012,
RAPAPORT (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticlelD=
37698.
192. KPCS, supra note 5, § I.
193. Wexler, supra note 27, at 1770.
194. See Celia W. Dugger, Africa's Diamond Trade Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
3, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/worldlafrica/04zimbabwe.html; Dugger,
supra note 188, at 2.
195. See Ecologist, supra note 135.
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and want the coalition government to fail.19 6 Since these troops run the
torture camps and smuggle diamonds into Mozambique, some argue
they qualify as "rebels" looking to overthrow the coalition
government. 197
While this argument is appealing for those who want the KPCS to
solve the problem of Marange diamonds, it is clearly a very far stretch.
Rebels do not try to overthrow a government by ensuring that the
president of nearly thirty-two years remains in power. This twists the
definitions of "rebel" and "undermine" to an extent that would cause
even most lawyers to shake their heads. Pretending that a definition
covers more than it does only leads to confusion and further denial.
This is not the way to prove that Marange diamonds should be banned.
F. KPCS Principles
The KPCS contains more than narrow definitions. The document
and the process it developed explicitly acknowledge the "systematic and
gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated" in conflicts
fueled by conflict diamonds.198 The aim of the KP "is to exclude conflict
diamonds from international markets and to prevent diamond-fuelled
wars;"199 "[a]t its core, the KP is about stopping human rights abuse
linked to diamonds."200 At the KP meeting in June 2011, President of
the World Diamond Council, Eli Izhakoff stated that the KP was "about
humanity, not politics" 201 and urged all Participants to return to that
core principle:
196. See Eddie Cross, Does Zim Qualify for Kimberley Process?, ZIM. INDEP. (Nov. 10,
2011), http://www.theindependent.co.zw/opinion/33071-does-zim-qualify-for-kimberley-pro
cess.html; Dugger, supra note 177 (noting that "civic groups and leaders in Mr. Biti's
party are deeply concerned that the military, still entrenched in the Marange diamond
fields and loyal to Mr. Mugabe, will use diamond profits to finance a campaign of violence
against the Movement for Democratic Change in elections that seem likely to be held next
year."); Bruce Loudon, Robert Mugabe's Bloody Regime Set in Stone, AUSTRALIAN (Nov.
16, 2011), http://www.theaustralian.com.aulnews/world/robert-mugabes-bloody-regime-
set-in-stone/story-e6frg6ux-1226195986532 ('Mugabe's murderous army has become part
of the exploration and selling process. The army is pivotal to keeping Mugabe, and his
successor, in power."); see also Smith, supra note 153.
197. See Cowell, supra note 16.
198. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl.
199. GLOBAL WITNESS, RETURN OF THE BLOOD DIAMOND 5 (2010), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/return-blood-diamond-deadly-race-control-zimbabwe
s-new-found-diamond-wealth.
200. SOKWANELE, supra note 95, at 10.
201. KP is About Humanity Not Politics WDC President Tells Meeting in Kinshasa,
MARKET DIRECT (June 20, 2011), available at http://www.mdirect-business.com/content/
kimberley-process-about-humanity-not-politics-wdc-president-tells-meeting-kinshasa.
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At its core, the Kimberley Process is about protecting the
right of communities and individuals to derive properly
deserved benefit from natural resources. . . . First and
foremost, the Kimberley Process caters to the fundamental
needs of millions of ordinary men, women and children living
in developing areas, were diamonds are mined and processed.
. . . [W]hile we will not agree on everything, we . . . are
firmly committed to a trade in diamonds that is not tainted by
conflict . . .202
In the end, it should not matter what precise definition we use, the
Marange diamonds are covered in blood and should not be in the
market.
Unfortunately, while those who support the KP's authority to ban
Marange diamonds convincingly argue that the principle at issue is the
connection between diamonds and human rights abuses, the Preamble's
principles each reference "conflict diamonds" as defined within the
document. 203 The human rights activists and NGOs who helped create
this unique and impressive tool had to compromise and draw the lines
around "conflict diamonds" closely enough to gain the support of
diamond-producing nations and De Beers. 204 We are now seeing the full
cost of that compromise.
PART IV: ADDRESSING THE DILEMMA
Zimbabwe's Marange diamonds present a dilemma: they are
associated with precisely the type of violent conduct that triggered the
KPCS, yet they do not fit the well-established and politically defendable
definition. To get around the dilemma, we must either change the
definition or turn to a different mechanism that is not so limited.
A. Change the Definition
Diamonds other than conflict diamonds, as defined by the KPCS,
cause serious problems. 205 Zimbabwe proves that government-
controlled diamonds can come with as much spilled blood as the rebel-
controlled variety. Moreover, the conflicts these diamonds fuel and
their associated human rights abuses are not the only harms connected
to diamonds. Diamonds are regularly undeclared for tax evasion,
stolen, used for money laundering, smuggled, and used to fund
202. Id.
203. KPCS, supra note 5, pmbl.
204. See Zimbabwe: Official Lauds Diamond Trade Ruling, supra note 20.
205. Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6.
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terrorism 206 and other crimes. 207 Diamonds that are technically conflict
diamonds make up only a very small portion of all illicit diamond
trading; other illicit diamonds do not receive sufficient attention. 208
With only minor alterations to its document, the KPCS could
change this; substitute the word "illicit" for "conflict," and neither
Marange diamonds nor the massive diamond frauds in Brazil and
Guyana, for example, could have the KP stamp of approval. 209 Yet
simple in theory does not mean simple in practice. Expecting one
regulatory system to manage all diamond-related crimes in the world,
especially one with so many additional challenges, 210 is unrealistic - not
to mention the political resistance that would face such a proposal. But
expecting it to regulate all blood-covered diamonds may not be. As
other scholars and activists have argued, conflict diamonds should be
defined as "all those diamonds that come from areas where diamond
mining is based on the systematic violation of human rights."211
Yet, some KP Participants argue that the system "was designed
only to halt conflict diamonds and not the wider problem of illicit
diamonds." 212 They are likely unwilling to accept even the narrower
definition change that would condemn violent abuses to acquire
diamonds, regardless of the perpetrator. And yet, virtually all of the
internal African conflicts that led to the KPCS are over. 213 Today's
"rebel movements" are unlikely to aim only at overthrowing individual
governments; large-scale terrorism has greater appeal. So, what do we
do? Wait for some old-school rebels to grab some diamonds?
B. Change the Tool
Or do we develop a new tool for a new reality? Do we admit the
KPCS has run its course, or acknowledge it was useful only in terms of
its original limited scope? The activists and NGOs themselves are split.
And if we do abandon the KPCS, where do we next turn our attention?
Global Witness now claims that the diamond industry itself is the
206. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-978, CONFLICT DIAMONDS: AGENCY
ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN DIAMOND TRADE ACT 2
(2006) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251699.pdf.
207. Gooch, supra note 99, at 190-92; Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 7.
208. Passas & Jones, supra note 28, at 6.
209. KILLING KIMBERLEY, supra note 123.
210. See supra notes 91-96.
211. LUNDAS - THE STONES OF DEATH: ANGOLA'S DEADLY DIAMONDS: HuMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES IN THE LUNDA PROVINCES, 2004 18 (Rui Falcao de Campos & Rafael Marques, eds.
2005) [hereinafter STONES OF DEATH], available at http://www.medico.de/media/lundas--
the-stones-of-death-angolas-deadly-diamond.pdf- Wexler, supra note 27, at 1771.
212. Gooch, supra note 99, at 203.
213. Hummel, supra note 41, at 1167.
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greatest hope for addressing these human rights violations;
multinational corporate compliance regulations must eliminate the
current abusive practices. While this is undeniably accurate, there are
also other legal actions that the United States, strengthened by its
position as the new KP Chair, could utilize.
C. Multinational Corporate Compliance
Global Witness, one of the KPCS's founders, publicly declared the
system ineffective. 214 Ms. Dunnebacke of Global Witness, stated that
traders and dealers simply hide behind the KP, do not actually check
the sources of their diamonds, and that the KP has simply failed to
handle the situation at Marange. 215 Dunnebacke and Global Witness
now believe the solution to the problems of the diamond trade lie within
the industry itself: the focus must now be on requiring businesses and
companies to conduct business less abusively. 216
This tactic fits with a relatively recent United Nations ("UN") trend
to focus efforts on codifying expectations for international corporate
social responsibility. 217 In 1999, the UN's Global Compact became the
official initiative, actively encouraging corporations to volunteer to help
develop, adopt and implement principles of corporate social
responsibility. 218 The Global Compact's Ten Principles received
universal consensus and address appropriate corporate behavior in the
areas of human rights, labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. 219
Principles 1 and 2 discuss human rights: "Principle 1: Businesses
should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed
human rights; and Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in
human rights abuses."
Additionally important, two reports focused further attention on
developing comprehensive norms and positive obligations of
corporations with regards to human rights: the 2005 Report of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights on the
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business
214. Eligon, supra note 22.
215. Id.
216. Message from Founding Director Charmian Gooch, Global Witness, Why We Are
Leaving the Kimberley Process (Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.globalwitness.org/
library/why-we-are-leaving-kimberley-process-message-global-witness-founding-director-
charmian-gooch; Simon Allison, Zimbabwe: Kimberley Process - Flawless it is Not,
ALLAFRICA (Dec. 6, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201112070600.html; Ford, supra
note 6.
217. See, e.g., Wallis, supra note 26, at 410-11.
218. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/index.html
(last visited May 7, 2012).
219. Id.
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Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 220 and the 2010 Ruggie
Report on Business and Human Rights.221 These reports strive to direct
all corporations to use acceptable practices and also directly refer to
international human rights instruments, thereby creating "a stronger
and more widely accepted basis of human rights responsibilities
generally, and a jus cogens basis regarding some human rights."222 As
such, multinational corporations such as De Beers and others in the
diamond industry have both the duty to refrain from activities that
could violate human rights and to actively promote such rights. 223 As
these norms develop further, and more corporations accept them, the
force of international law will, in time, make such practices enforceable.
Yet they will only be enforceable to the extent that other UN
declarations are enforceable or to the extent of voluntary compliance.
Though Dunnebacke correctly states that diamond companies must
monitor their product, and UN instruments exist to encourage this
behavior, international regulation of multinational corporations still
lacks a good compliance track record. Ironically, shortly after it was
established, the KPCS was applauded as a new and different attempt at
increasing international corporate responsibility for human rights. 224
Unlike prior (and subsequent) UN forays into corporate responsibility,
the KPCS incorporated multiple constituencies into the process early
and actively. 225 Further, the WDC's warrantee system designed to
regulate the gems once they reach industry representatives is
specifically intended to involve the corporate entities in such
compliance. 226 If traders and dealers currently hide behind the KPCS,
they probably hide behind the warrantee system as well. 227 And if they
220. U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Protection & Promotion of
Human Rights, Report on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/2005/91; ESCOR,
61st Sess. (Feb. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/
Pages/Reports.aspx.
221. James Harrison, 2010 Ruggie Report on Business and Human Rights, INT'L L.
OBSERVER (Apr. 29, 2010), http://internationallawobserver.eul2010/04/29/2010-ruggie-
report-on-business-and-human-rights/.
222. Surya Deva, Comment, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?,
10 ILSA J INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 498 (2004).
223. Wallis, supra note 26, at 413.
224. Id. at 389; Allison, supra note 216 (discussing the certification programs of the oil,
petroleum, and other mineral industries); Ford, supra note 6 ('The KP was seen as the
flagship in a new generation of hybrid regulatory efforts.").
225. Ford, supra note 6.
226. See WDC WEBSITE, supra note 110, at 11-12.
227. The warrantees were proving unsuccessful even in 2004. Press Release, Amnesty
Int'l, Conflict Diamonds: Jewellers Keeping Consumers in the Dark (Oct. 18, 2004),
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do that, what will prevent them from doing the same with a different,
voluntary, and toothless mechanism?
Moreover, the degree of leverage NGOs had over the diamond
industry when the KPCS formed has diminished. Neither the political
will nor the industry fear that existed in 2000 exists today. 228 The
United States is no longer the primary diamond purchaser on the
market as it was eleven years ago; 229 the controversial sales of Marange
diamonds in the summer of 2010 prove that India and China are more
than willing to purchase any diamonds the United States boycotts. 230
International corporate compliance and social responsibility is vital
to the success and sustainability of our society and its resources - both
human and non-human alike. It is a necessary tool for ending diamond
related abuses. However, it is not sufficient.
D. United States Laws and Policies
It is time we look to other available tools to supplement, but not
replace, the KPCS and international corporate compliance. In January
2012, the United States took over the rotating chair of the KP. This
may prove the best chance for the KPCS and for addressing diamond
related human rights abuses in general. 231 The United States initially
condemned the violence in Zimbabwe, 232 disclaimed KP's authorization
for the 2010 sales and advised consumers to boycott the gems.
Unfortunately, its silence following lifting the ban casts doubt on its
stance. Yet, the opportunity still exists.
Current U.S. legislation could stem the flow of bloody diamonds
and punish those who trade them. For example, the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), originally passed in 1789, allows non-American citizens to sue
"for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of
available at http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/POL30/038/2004/es/9f6b2886-faa9-
1ldd-b6c4-73blaal57d32/pol300382004en.pdf.
228. Wallis, supra note 26, at 401.
229. Id. at 399-400. In 2005, the United States still "[a]ccount[ed] for over half of
global diamond retail sales," though this number had already decreased. Fluet, supra
note 38, at 113.
230. See Jason Moyo, MDC Wants Marange Nationalized, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE
(Nov. 25, 2011), http://mg.co.zalarticle/2011-11-25-mdc-wants-marange-nationalised.
231. Miller, supra note 191.
232. Diamond Revenue Should Be Supported By New Legal Framework, Zim Officials
Say, ISRAELI DIAMOND INDUS. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.israelidiamond.co.il
lenglishlNews.aspx?bonelD=918&objID=10361; Yoliswa Dube, Year 2012 Expected to
Present Better Opportunities for Zimbabweans, CHRONICLE (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.chronicle.co.zwlindex.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=28735:year-
2012-expected-to-present-better-opportunities-for-zimbabweans&catid=39:opinion-a-
analysis&Itemid=132.
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the United States." 233 Although debates regarding the ATS are still
prevalent, this statute provides a cause of action in U.S. courts for a
narrow set of claims asserting a violation of the law of nations.234 While
this set of claims was originally extremely limited, it is expanding.
Most relevant here, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit
concluded that the right to be free from torture was proscribed by the
law of nations. 235 The victims of the Diamond Base torture camps,
therefore, could possibly bring a cause of action against their torturers
under the ATS. 236
Furthermore, the United States has experience enacting legislation
to harshly sanction countries that participate in trade the United States
disfavors. For example, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(ILSA) authorized the President to penalize foreign companies,
individuals and sometimes nations trading with Iran or Libya, because
the United States deemed these nations sponsor terrorism. 237
Additionally, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act) 238 sanctioned corporations
who maintained specific trading relations with Cuba. The Act's stated
goal was to encourage a democratic Cuban government and was aimed
at preventing other countries from trading with Cuba until it created
such a government.239
Each of these Acts has critics and complications, but each, and the
lessons they hopefully taught, could provide the stricter enforcement of
clean diamond norms. 240 The United States should not go out and
sanction countries at will; yet in the current environment of relatively
weak international enforcement, domestic nations with the power and
233. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004).
234. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13.
235. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. There are additional requirements under the ATS, but going into such detail is
beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently heard oral
arguments in Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
248. On March 5, 2012, the Court ordered re-argument and additional briefs on the issue
of whether the ATS allows U.S. courts to hear lawsuits for violations of international law
committed on foreign soil. If the Court determines that such jurisdiction does not exist,
this would obviously prevent the type of civil suit that could so benefit victims of human
rights abuses at Marange. However, at the time of writing this article, the Court has not
made such a ruling. Raising public awareness about the benefits the ATS could provide
for enforcing human rights is now even more important.
237. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006) [hereinafter ILSA].
See Fluet, supra note 38, at 120.
238. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6021
(2006) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
239. Id. § 6021(11); see also Fluet, supra note 38, at 121
240. See Fluet, supra note 38, at 119-24.
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legal ability to combat the generally disregarded horrific violence in
Zimbabwe have the responsibility to take action. Given the United
States' role in the KP, its continuing - though weakened - importance
in the diamond market, and its relationships with members of the
diamond industry, it is time to take a greater stand against the
Marange atrocities.
PART V: ACTION STEPS TOWARD A SOLUTION
Inaction and implied inability are no longer acceptable. By
adopting the following suggestions, important players in the
international effort to regulate diamond-related atrocities could both
eliminate the dilemma in Zimbabwe and direct international attention
on actually putting an end to such atrocities.
First, the Kimberley Process, the World Diamond Council and the
United States must each make public statements regarding their views
on the relationship between diamonds and human rights. Quite simply,
using systematic human rights abuses to mine or trade diamonds is
unacceptable. Each of these three bodies must then take decisive steps
to support this statement.
A. The Kimberley Process
At least two influential groups have publically declared that it is
time to abandon the KPCS. As detailed above, both Global Witness and
RapNet pulled out of the KP, citing Zimbabwe as final proof that the KP
is unable to address human rights violations related to diamonds. 241
Though neither group suggests disassembling the organization, both
believe that it is now incapable of handling today's true diamond
conflicts.
However, good arguments also exist for giving the KPCS an
overhaul and one final chance. Importantly, growing amounts of
evidence support the contention that illicit diamond sales help finance
global terrorism. 242 Leveraging and highlighting this evidence could
trigger the political will needed to make the necessary reforms. The
spokesman for the European Union's High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy wrote that the KP "may not be a perfect
241. Andersson, supra note 14; Rapaport, supra note 24.
242. "In early November 2001, the Washington Post broke the story that conflict
diamonds helped finance Al Qaeda .... " Feldman, supra note 10, at 853; Fluet, supra
note 38, at 103-04; Hummel, supra note 41, at 1158; Vetter, supra note 39, at 737; Ian
Smillie, Motherhood, Apple Pie & False Teeth: Corporate Social Responsibility in the
Diamond Industry, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT 4-5 (June 2003), availabie
at http://www.globalpolicy.org/secuirty/natres/diamonds/2003/0603-pac.pdf; Maggi, supra
note 114, at 536-37.
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instrument, but it is the best we have, and therefore all parties,
including civil society, should work to make it effective." 243 Achieving
this will require a significant overhaul involving changes to both
substantive and procedural aspects of the KPCS.
First, the KP must change the definition of conflict diamonds. The
original definition no longer accurately describes the realities of today's
diamond conflict. As described above, the KP could change the
definition in a number of different ways, reflecting varying degrees of
how comprehensively it wants to address diamond-related crime. For
now, the KPCS should continue to regulate only conflict diamonds.
Based on today's diamond conflicts, a conflict diamond should now be
any diamond that comes "from areas where mining is based on the
systematic violation of human rights."244 If at some later date the KP
decides it can address all illicit diamonds, it can add that provision
then.
Second, the KP must regain credibility. To do so, it must be truly
accountable for ensuring that it identifies all conflict diamonds, as
newly defined. It must also acknowledge the need to allow Participant
states' governments some degree of protection.
The KP should adopt a more quasi-judicial structure. The KP
investigative teams, which already act as fact-finders and submit
reports to the KP, should be responsible for making specific findings of
fact. In order for the KP to identify certain stones as conflict diamonds,
it should be required to make a specific finding that systematic human
rights violations are occurring with reference to specific mines. Only
after such a finding should KPCS certification be denied. Whether or
not the KP agrees with the investigation team's finding will still require
a consensus decision. This will clearly cause some of the same concerns
and challenges that currently exist. However, by becoming more
accountable for identifying systematic human rights violations in the
diamond context, and making specific findings of this nature, any KP
Participant who does not vote to ban diamonds from mines operating
with systematic human rights abuses will become the focus of
international pressure. Additionally, the KP should develop some form
of appeals mechanism, through which the owner of the identified mine
can object to the finding and be fairly heard.
243. Eligon, supra note 22.
244. STONES OF DEATH, supra note 211. Martin Rapaport's definition of "blood
diamonds" is also acceptable: "Blood diamonds are diamonds involved in murder,
mutilation, rape or forced servitude." Rapaport, supra note 24.
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B. The World Diamond Council
At the end of January 2010, Martin Rapaport, Chairman of the
Rapaport Group, resigned from the WDC. He explained his reasons in
a letter to the WDC and in an article published immediately following
his resignation. He specifically cites WDC's support of KP actions
regarding Marange and points to the difference between his group's
definition of blood diamonds and the KP's definition of conflict
diamonds as the cause of the problem:
To understand how this could happen, we must define "blood
diamonds" and compare our definition to the KP definition of "conflict
diamonds."
Rapaport definition:"Blood diamonds are diamonds involved in
murder, mutilation, rape or forced servitude."
KP definition:"Conflict diamonds means rough diamonds used by
rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining
legitimate governments, as described in relevant United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or
in other similar UNSC resolutions which may be adopted in the future,
and as understood and recognised in United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in other similar UNGA resolutions which
may be adopted in future . . ."245
Rapaport recognized the fact that the KP definition of conflict
diamonds does not address human rights violations and does not
include all diamonds included under his definition blood diamonds -
such as those from Marange. 246 Later, following the KP announcement
in November 2011 that Marange diamonds were certified, RapNet
informed its 6,750 members that it had banned all trade of Marange
diamonds. 247 As stated above, RapNet is the world's largest diamond
trading network and it will now publically suspend, expel, and name
any company who violates the boycott of Marange diamonds. 248
The rest of the WDC needs to follow Rapaport and RapNet's lead.
The diamond industry, represented by WDC, must consider their
consumers; the average person who purchases a diamond is not
interested in legal technicalities. While not every customer considers
245. Rapaport, supra note 24.
246. Id.
247. Taurai Mangudhla, Rapaport Tightens Screws on Zim Diamond Trade, DAILY
NEWS (N.Z.) (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.dailynews.co.zw/index.php/business/35business
/6237-rapaport-tightens-screws-on-zim-diamond-trade.html.
248. Id.
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human rights when purchasing a diamond, those who do will identify
with Rapaport's definition and not the KP's. Such conscientious
customers will not support the idea that diamonds mined through
forced labor, murder, and rape are "Conflict-Free." By banning all such
diamonds from the legitimate trade, regardless of KP certification, the
WDC could demonstrate its commitment to truly responsible business.
As the green movement before it, customers will prove that responsible
business practices that take a stand against human rights violations
make good business sense.
To further this type of practice, the WDC must take an active role
in implementing effective corporate compliance measures in all its
members. The current system of WDC warrantees is insufficient. The
RapNet and the Responsible Jewellery Council ("RJC"), an
international non-profit organization with over 350 member companies,
each have corporate compliance structures and more effective
identification and certification procedures to ensure the ethical quality
of their companies and products. 249 By working with these
organizations, and others like Global Witness who are committed to
corporate compliance and ethical trade, the WDC could become a leader
in the field, ensure that blood diamonds are truly excluded from the
market, and increase profits for its members all at the same time.
C. The United States
The United States is currently in a position to take the lead in
combating blood diamonds. As chair of the KP, the U.S. should propose
an amendment to change the definition of conflict diamonds. This
would show that the U.S. is not just paying "lip service" to the notion
that people should not profit from inflicting serious human rights
abuses. Additionally, the U.S. should take additional steps to follow
and support RapNet's ban on Marange diamonds. While it is true that
a U.S. boycott would no longer have the same impact it once would
have, it would still have significant repercussions and serve as a
powerful statement.
The U.S. must also take advantage of the existing laws that could
influence those responsible for the atrocities in Zimbabwe. Recognizing
the fact that it would be difficult, the U.S. should turn its attention to
finding an appropriate way to bring a case under the Alien Tort
Statute. As noted previously, the U.S. Supreme Court just recently
249. See RESPONSIBLE JEWELLERY COUNCIL, http://www.responsiblejewellery.com/
(last visited Apr. 28, 2012).
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heard oral arguments on a case involving the ATS. 250 A suit brought
against perpetrators of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, with
public support from the U.S. government, would send the message that
the U.S. firmly believes that such crimes are unacceptable, even in the
name of profit, and that it is willing to hold people accountable for such
actions.
Each of these proposed solutions presents significant difficulties of
their own. Politics, policy, international relations and money will all
pose obstacles to the effective implementation and enforcement of each
of these suggestions. To deny this reality is naive. And yet, to let them
become paralyzing is unacceptable. It is just as unrealistic, and far
more irresponsible, to wait around for a group of power-hungry rebels to
steal some Marange diamonds.
PART VI: CONCLUSION
The "idealist's" understanding of symbolic value and the "realist's"
insistence on effective practicalities are trapped within the
conscientious International Human Rights lawyer. These competing
perspectives crash together in Zimbabwe. We do not want to see
powerful symbols of cooperation, such as the Kimberley Process,
abandoned simply because they are not as practically effective as we
had hoped. Yet, we need practical solutions. Global Witness pulled out
of the KP not because its absence will change KP's behavior, but
because of the symbolism of a founding member deserting a project it
now calls ineffective. If more organizations follow suit, it may well
prove a symbolic gesture with fatal consequences for the KPCS.
A comprehensive approach to ending diamond-fueled violence and
destruction requires a multilateral approach. 251 Both the KP and the
WDC should participate in that approach, but each is running out of
time to prove their willingness to address the diamond conflicts of the
21st century. Both organizations must strengthen their policies with
regard to diamonds mined through human rights abuses. The new U.S.
Chair must push to amend the definition of conflict diamonds to that
250. See discussion of Kiobel, supra note 236. Kiobel involves a group of twelve
Nigerians who brought suit under the ATS against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
seeking damages and other relief for the company's assistance and complicity in torture,
extrajudicial executions, and other violations of international law committed by the
Nigerian government. Originally, the main issue in the case was whether corporations
were immune from tort liability for such violations. Given the recent order for re-
argument, however, the primary issue will now focus on whether the ATS grants
jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear cases involving violations of international law that
occurred outside of the territorial United States.
251. Fluet, supra note 38, at 124.
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stated above: "all those gems that come from areas where mining is
based on the systematic violation of human rights."252
The WDC should adopt RapNet's definition of blood diamonds and
publically recognize that any diamond involved in rape, murder, or
other human rights violations simply is not "Conflict-Free."
Additionally, the U.S. should both use its existing law and develop new
elements to increase the pressure on those who seek to benefit from
illicit diamond trade. While the ATS currently stands on a threshold,
waiting to see whether or not the U.S. Supreme Court strips it of its
intended scope, public opinion can still exert real power. If, in the
upcoming term, the Court determines that the ATS only provides
jurisdiction for U.S. courts to hear cases involving tortious violations of
international law occurring on American soil, then Congress must take
active steps to pass new legislation that would allow for U.S. civil suits
to condemn actions such as those in Marange.
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is far from perfect, but
if we abandon every tool that does not provide all the solutions we hope
for, the time and energy spent creating them may have been wasted.
Giving up is not the answer; adapting and incorporating new
mechanisms may be. The Kimberley Process and the World Diamond
Council have one final opportunity to prove to the world that they are
concerned with all violent human rights abuses perpetrated in the
name of diamonds. If they cannot do this, then they should remain
committed only to preventing rebel forces from using diamonds to fund
civil war. And they should say as much. Lying to customers and the
international community by claiming that the Kimberley Process
ensures honestly conflict-free diamonds is unacceptable. The hypocrisy
must end, one way or another. The conflict of diamonds is complicated,
but it is a conflict we can overcome.
252. STONES OF DEATH, supra note 211.
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